




Bridging the Gap between ‘War’ and ‘Peace’: 




August 2014 marked the beginning of a four-year long period of international 
commemorative activities to honour the centenary of the First World War. The 
magnified significance awarded to the conflict has brought with it a vigorous national 
appetite in Britain to locate examples of sacrifice, heroism, and the force of the human 
spirit. The experience of refugees from Belgium, given shelter in Britain from the 
earliest days of the conflict, has provided just such a ready-made narrative for a 
‘useable past’ which has allowed British politicians to claim moral cache for the 
historical treatment of immigrants.1 Similarly, within the retelling of that history, the 
British public have been encouraged to accept the hugely simplistic and yet 
comforting narrative of their nation as a bulwark of long-entrenched liberal values.2 
 In reality, whilst the estimated 250,000 so-called ‘Belgian refugees’ who 
found their way to Britain, largely between August 1914 and the end of 1915 (for 
exiles from other beleaguered continental nations who had arrived via Belgium also 
found themselves inaccurately characterised thus), were the recipients of an 
unprecedented outpouring of localised philanthropy, labour initiatives and an 
(initially) warm welcome, their treatment fell far from the model of amiable relations 
often claimed. This was none more so apparent than in the British government’s 
scheme for the repatriation of the refugees at the end of the war which descended into 
an exercise in hasty, even brutal efficiency to rid the country of any refugee who 
remained. By January 1920, of the possible 12,000 who had not returned to the 
continent under their own steam, or taken up the government’s offer of ‘free’ (that is, 
predicated on certain draconian conditions) passage to Belgium, those who lingered 
found themselves the object of increasingly stringent rhetoric which reframed them as 
a ‘problem’, and their ‘option’ of repatriation replaced by the prospect of forced 
deportation.3   
 Although the pace of scholarship about the experience of Belgian refugees in 
Britain has increased exponentially in recent years, going some way towards rescuing 
this episode of displacement and exile from oblivion, attention paid to the final stages 
of that experience has been sorely lacking.4 Besides the often cursory mention of the 
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repatriation scheme, typically used to provide a neat ending to accounts of the refugee 
movement, few histories have examined in detail the particulars of the government 
policy to extract Belgians from villages, towns and cities across the country.5 Neither 
has there been any sustained consideration of the conditions that the returned faced 
once they arrived back in their war-torn, economically devastated and socially 
traumatised homeland. Instead the scholarship has often sadly echoed the attitude of 
the British state towards the refugees; that is, once the refugees were ‘out of sight’ of 
Britain, they found themselves ‘out of mind’ too. Yet, as Colin Holmes pointed out in 
his seminal study of immigration to Britain from the Victorian period onwards, traces 
of the Belgians remained, often in very tangible forms, “in the shape of the National 
Projectile Factory at Birtley, the run-down Kryn and Lahy works at Letchworth […], 
‘the Belgian houses’ in Derby, the painting by Franzoni on the ‘Landing of the 
Belgian refugees August 1914’ . . . and [at the time of writing at least] the existence of 
women, now growing old in Belgium, whose name of Angele commemorate their 
birth in England”.6 Such legacies of the wartime refugee presence linger not only in 
Britain’s built environment but also in the local histories of communities who 
provided housing, jobs and charity to arriving Belgians. Their memories of this 
exceptional time did not cease with the ending of hostilities but often stayed with 
families and communities for many years. In a no doubt far larger number of cases 
than have been documented, for example, relations between the hosts and the hosted 
after 1918 frequently endured through regular postal correspondence and even mutual 
visits to one another’s homelands.7  
 This rather glaring neglect of the various facets of the refugees’ negotiation of 
the bridge between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ speaks perhaps of the more widespread 
tendency within the historiography to bracket First World War histories with the 
somewhat artificial chronological construction ‘1914 – 1918’. Whilst these years 
certainly mark the ‘official’ start and end point of the conflict, they make no 
allowances for either the long build-up to the outbreak of hostilities, nor the human 
‘fall-out’ and long and often immensely difficult period of national reconstruction 
which many states faced in and beyond the inter-war years. So too, however, does this 
lacunae reflect the void which refugees often find themselves cast into when what 
should be ‘their’ history comes to be written. Even in the retelling of the trans-
national histories of international conflict, refugees have and continue to ‘fall into the 
cracks’ of history, typically falling outside of national histories whilst also sitting 
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uncomfortably with the cross-national tendency (in First World War studies at least) 
to prioritise front line action over home front experience; bloody sacrifice and 
heroism over civilian displacement.8 As Peter Gatrell has pointed out in his history of 
refugees from the Russian Empire during the First World War, “soldiers had a chance 
to become heroes; but no refugee was lionized. Even in death, military and civilian 
casualties were accorded different treatment. There are no war graves for the 
thousands of refugees who died en route to a ‘place of safety’ ”.9 
 This chapter will seek to correct this oversight by arguing that these latter 
stages of the Belgian refugee experience offer more than simply a bookend to a four-
year long period of international conflict. Indeed, a closer examination of the 
processes whereby those in exile found themselves returned to the continent reveals 
much about both the continued erosion of British Liberalism, as well as the anxieties 
of a nation emerging from a prolonged period of international uncertainty to face, 
once again, the challenges of domestic volatility, economic fragility and social unrest. 
So too, however, does attention paid to the early days and months of peacetime offer 
an opportunity to touch upon, albeit briefly, the ‘twilight zone’ which returning 
refugees, retreating armies, displaced civilians and others navigated; a strange 
temporal and spatial ‘no-man’s-land’ between the official ending of hostilities and the 
beginnings of national reconstruction schemes. Examining this much overlooked 
‘twilight zone’ helps to expose the fallacy of the immediate aftermath of war as a time 
of ‘peace’. For refugees returning to Belgium, the point of arrival back ‘home’ 
marked, instead, the commencement of a long period of turmoil and transition, the 
traumas of which entered and still remain evident in Belgium’s own First World War 
memory culture.  
 
From Repatriation to Deportation 
The logistics of managing both small and large-scale repatriation schemes had long 
been on the wartime government’s agenda. From the earliest weeks and months of the 
conflict, the foreign office had grappled with the challenge of extracting British 
citizens from German-occupied zones of France and Belgium. As the curtain of war 
descended across northern Europe, hundreds of Britons found themselves trapped on 
the wrong side of the front line, stranded there in some cases after a short, but poorly 
timed sojourn to the continent. For others, Belgium or France had provided 
opportunities for work, for family life and for cultural enrichment – all sadly curtailed 
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in the summer of 1914 under the shroud of war. Yet securing the release of civilians 
was no easy feat and, even after two years of war, the foreign office remained 
extremely busy with the task of fielding communications from Britons increasingly 
desperate for news of their family members all but incarcerated behind enemy lines.10  
 The British government also found itself facing the inverse scenario: what to 
do with ‘enemy aliens’ living in Britain. At the outbreak of war, parliament wasted 
little time deciding upon the necessity of encouraging the departure or hastening the 
deportation of German and Austro-Hungarian citizens. The Aliens Restriction Act, a 
stringent modification of the Aliens Act of 1905, rapidly reconfigured under cover of 
war to restrict and exclude all “undesirable aliens”, passed into law after its first 
reading in the House of Commons on August 5, 1914.11 Under the terms of the 
legislation, “undesirable” women, children and men who were unable to join up (the 
elderly and the invalided) as well as doctors and church ministers, were identified as 
prime targets for repatriation.12 By May 1915, in the wake of the sinking of the 
Lusitania and the shift towards a far more uncompromising policy of interning male 
enemy aliens, those who were not at immediate threat of incarceration (women and 
men beyond military age) nonetheless had to justify why they should be allowed to 
remain.13 This state-led determination to ‘root out’ any possible threat to national 
security resulted, by the end of 1919, in the repatriation of almost 30,000 aliens.14 
 Belgians who lived out the war in Britain were also subject to a catalogue of 
policy manoeuvres by the British state that may have been different in tone but 
differed little in their overarching ambition. Indeed, whilst Belgians had been broadly 
welcomed to Britain as ‘friendly aliens’ at the outbreak of war, their plight and 
presence becoming a useful emblem of German tyranny, and a ready weapon for the 
fierce Germanophobic propaganda campaign waged in Britain, they too found 
themselves subject to the draconian measures enacted under the Aliens Restriction 
Act. This determined where refugees were allowed to settle as well as where they 
might visit, excluding them from port towns, seaside resorts and coastal locations 
more broadly.15 Moreover, whilst the refugee population was spared the threat of 
internment and, during the war years at least, forced deportation, it was always the 
intention of the British government that the refugees should be returned en masse to 
Belgium after the war. Herbert Samuel, President of the Local Government Board 
(LGB), the parliamentary body charged with supervising the relief of the incoming 
Belgians, had been careful to temper expectations about the duration of the Belgians’ 
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stay in Britain from the outset. In a speech to the House of Commons in September 
1914, Samuel took great care to caveat his confidence that ‘many individuals 
throughout the country will be ready to join in offering asylum here’ with the 
assurance that such hospitality would only be expected “until conditions in Belgium 
enable the refugees to return”.16 State hospitality towards “Brave little Belgium” 
appeared, then, when seen in this light, as little more than a useful tool to nurture the 
impression of a continued commitment to liberalism, tolerance and the right of 
asylum. So too was it a useful weapon of propaganda in the fight against the “evil 
hun”. Yet, hospitality was, in reality, bestowed on a temporary basis only. 
Repatriation, rather than naturalisation was, from the inception of the relief scheme, 
the ultimate goal.          
This commitment to repatriation was in evidence at both a local, national and 
even international level from the early stages of the war, even when its foresighted 
aspirations was seen to be at odds with the more immediate need to provide relief.17 
The Belgian Repatriation Fund, established by the English wife of the Belgian 
Secretary of State, had been set up to anticipate the needs of Belgian people who 
chose to return to liberated zones in advance of state-funded repatriation initiatives. 
Its early establishment was an indicator of the assumption – pervasive even into 1915 
– that the war would be short.18 Madam Vandervelte, the mastermind behind the fund, 
disseminated appeals across Britain and its Empire, beseeching the Empire’s citizens 
to give generously.19 Local communities in Britain also found themselves the objects 
of this charity drive to secure donations to the fund. Posters disseminated across the 
country placed the onus on “English men and women” to “remember August, 1914”; 
a sentiment accompanied by a cartoon from Punch showing a belligerent Germany 
confronted by a diminutive and yet determined Belgium blocking their passage. This 
lobbying for funding positioned Britons as owing a ‘moral debt’ to Belgium for its 
early sacrifices. The Repatriation Fund – distinct from the objectives of the later 
Repatriation Committee – also looked to shift the onus onto the British people, 
reminding them that “The Governments of England and Belgium are doing much, but 
they cannot do everything. Individual cases of hardship must be met by individual 
generosity. Do not allow Government to pay all your debts”.20  
However, from August 1916 the government took over the mantel of co-
ordinating and driving forward the arrangements for the inevitable task of repatriation. 
Planning began even whilst war still raged and any prospect of returning the refugees 
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to their besieged homeland was unrealistic at best. The LGB nonetheless pushed on 
with the task of appointing a committee to examine the question of how the 
repatriation of the Belgian exiles should be managed. The aptly named Repatriation 
Committee, headed up by Basil Peto, Conservative MP for Devizes, took a full year to 
investigate the matter, reporting in July 1917. From the earliest pages of the 
committee’s interim report it became evident that finding a method of repatriating 
whilst hostilities continued was not as remote a possibility as was at first assumed. 
However, the decision, the committee concluded, “must be governed in the first 
instance by the views of the General Headquarters Staffs of the Allied Forces in the 
West”. Of secondary consideration were the conditions in Belgium itself. These 
would come into play only if and when the war had come to an end. In those 
circumstances, the committee magnanimously agreed, “the economic and industrial 
conditions prevailing in Belgium will be the deciding factor upon which the 
arrangements for the return of refugees will depend”. Indeed, the committee 
acknowledged, feeding, housing and finding employment for the returning refugees 
were “all so intimately connected” with the broader challenges of national 
reconstruction in Belgium that any repatriation scheme had to be considered in 
relation to these issues. 21  
Whilst a large number of refugees had taken it upon themselves to return to 
Belgium or neighbouring states during the course of the First World War, a sizable 
number still remained by the war’s conclusion. The central register of refugees, 
collated in early August 1919, calculated that 12,408 Belgians still resided in various 
districts across England, Scotland and Wales. However, the majority had come to 
congregate in the capital either for the purposes of work, to be closer to the cultural 
core of the Belgian expatriate community or, as became increasingly the case as the 
war reached its zenith, to be the first in line when the provisions for repatriation to 
Belgium had been put in place.22 This was a point of concern for the committee, not 
least because few options for housing a large influx of refugees in the capital existed. 
Whilst the refugee camps set up in Earls Court and Alexandra Palace to deal with the 
inward flow of migrants could accommodate approximately 4,000 and 3,000 
respectively, few other large sites across London were equipped to accept a large, 
transient and unemployed community of aliens.  
However, this was more than a logistical problem, as the committee 
acknowledged. The “danger of friction” arising between the refugees and “our own 
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people” as wartime labour opportunities dried up and many Belgians of working age 
were forced out of work loomed large as a potential flashpoint for antagonism 
between the hosts and the hosted.23 Certainly, some isolated cases of visible 
discontent had arisen in the course of the war, usually predicated on localised 
frustrations about the perceived ‘privileges’ that the Belgians were enjoying at the 
expense of the local population. This was the case in Fulham, West London where 
refugees were accused of the dual crimes of occupying in-demand housing stock as 
well as being in receipt of more favourable relief packages than that received by the 
families of British soldiers.24 Yet violent manifestations of such tensions were largely 
limited to locations of concentrated Belgian presence. At the munitions works at 
Birtley in Tyneside, employer of 6,000 Belgians (overwhelmingly conscripted 
soldiers), it was the Belgians themselves who in December 1916 turned to violent 
means to express their discontent with the conditions that they were subject to.25  
Such episodes were rare; more typical was a general apathy towards the 
‘plight’ of the Belgians as the war dragged on, manifesting, on occasion, into an 
outspoken disgruntlement that the Belgian community appeared to enjoy the 
‘benefits’ of philanthropy, hospitality and goodwill, whilst avoiding the ‘hardships’ of 
wartime shortages and conscription.26 This disgruntlement was compounded still 
further as the war dragged on and pressures on local communities to give up their men 
to conscription increased. Belgian refugees, more difficult to conscript because of 
their dispersion across Britain and other allied nations, found themselves labelled as 
“shirkers”.27   
However, the drive to repatriate the Belgians did not emanate solely from the 
British hosts. The Belgian government was also keen to encourage the return of their 
exiled citizens.28 Yet organisation on this front, at least during the war itself, was 
fragmentary. Instead, a ‘home-grown’ drive to bring the refugees home more typically 
emanated from locally concentrated bodies such as religious congregations. Their 
efforts however were, and could only ever, be advisory, using the force of rhetorical 
persuasion and patriotic sentiment to keep the notion of ‘return’ ever present in the 
refugees’ mind-set. The tone of sermons delivered by Father Callewaert, priest to 
refugees in Stockport and surrounding districts, typified such efforts. As one Belgian 
congregant recalled in the refugee’s magazine Echo de Belgique in August 1916, 
Father Callewaert had spoken “so movingly” to the group of refugees there gathered 
of their future return that “our hearts beat with heartfelt enthusiasm as we imagined 
80 
 
how the church bells of Mechelen, Bruges and Antwerp would once again ring out 
with our song of redemption”.29 Hence, whilst few or possibly no grass-roots 
organisation to manage the logistics of repatriation emerged from within the refugee 
community itself, the decision taken by many individuals and families to return to 
Belgium or one of the neighbouring countries, even whilst war continued, suggests 
the success of such rhetoric.30 Indeed, the steady flow of Belgians back to the 
continent from 1915 onwards did much to confirm the hopes of the delegation of 
Belgian officials posted to Britain to oversee the welfare of the Belgian community 
resident there that, for those who had not opted to self-repatriate by the war’s 
conclusion, rapid return as soon as circumstances allowed would be their primary 
objective. As Count Goblet d’Alviella, Vice-President of the Belgian senate, 
confidently asserted, “It goes without saying that the refugees, although proclaiming 
their indebtedness to the English nation, anxiously await the end of their exile”.31  
In light of the Belgian state’s eagerness to guarantee the future loyalty of their 
citizens, the Repatriation Committee acknowledged the need to give the Belgian 
government some degree of regulatory power over the process of repatriation when 
the time came. From the outset, the committee agreed that “every person who desires 
to return, except at his own expense, must apply to the Belgian Repatriation Office, 
and that in no case will any facilities be given by the British Authorities until an 
individual authorisation has been sent from Belgium”.32 This appeared to bestow a 
degree of control upon the Belgian authorities to manage the flow of returning 
migrants. In reality, however, the Repatriation Committee harboured its own 
ambitions as to which ‘type’ of refugee they felt should be preferenced. These were, 
in the main, unemployed Belgians, prioritised for return to subvert the possibility of 
antagonism arising between Britons and Belgians.33 The rapidity with which the 6,000 
Belgians employed at the Birtley munitions work found themselves shipped back to 
Belgium at the close of the war is a telling manifestation of the British government’s 
nervousness on this point. The Ministry of Munitions, charged with the task of 
overseeing the Birtley community, grappled with the question of what to do with the 
Belgians employed there as the prospect of peace seemed ever more likely. It became, 
for Maurice S. Gibb, Representative of the Ministry of Munitions, by far the most 
“pressing question” concerning the factory’s future. However, options for “managing” 
the refugee population under peacetime conditions seemed limited. Whilst the sudden 
mass unemployment of the Belgian munitions workers was the most likely outcome 
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of the transition from war to peace, this outcome was to be avoided if at all possible. 
Indeed, so desperate was Whitehall to avoid this scenario that Gibb declared it “better 
to waste steel” by continuing to employ Belgians to manufacture shells rather than 
“allow[ing] the Belgians to do nothing, and so get into mischief, and possibly, on 
account of the amount of time on their hands, commence quarrelling with the 
neighbouring miners and others”.34 
 This very scenario remained a core concern of the committee who, as the 
weeks passed by, insisted that, under no circumstances should Belgian munitions 
workers be allowed to remain at Birtley “in idleness”.35 Whilst the logistical 
arrangements for transporting the sizable Birtley community to Hull and from there 
on to Antwerp were not straight forward, this did little to deter the government from 
prioritising their departure above all other communities and regions. By February 
1919, virtually all of the 6,000 Belgians previously housed in the refugee village of 
Elisabethville and employed at Birtley had returned to Belgium. By June 1919, after a 
nine day auction, all of their furniture and household items that they were unable to fit 
within their meagre 300 pounds allowance, had been sold off.36 In less than 8 months 
after the end of hostilities, few obvious signs of the Birtley Belgians remained. Whilst 
the buildings which had housed them still stood, at least until the 1930s, the site itself 
was put to different use after the Belgians’ departure, helping to erode still further the 
memory of their presence.  
 Whilst the Ministry of Munitions had managed the mass repatriation of the 
Birtley Belgians with ruthless efficiency, the Repatriation Committee had less success 
orchestrating the return of Belgians dispersed elsewhere in the country. Notices 
warning of an impending repatriation scheme had been placed in the local and 
national press, as well as being distributed to the refugees directly, in Flemish, French 
and English by way of the LGB and the Belgian Legation.37 However, the War Relief 
Committee (WRC) – the conglomerate of philanthropic and charitable bodies who 
had facilitated aid for the Belgians from the earliest months of the war - increasingly 
found itself excluded from the discussions surrounding repatriation. By the final days 
of 1918, the WRC was forced to relinquish all responsibility for the refugees’ welfare 
and return, disbanding by the close of the year.  
This rapid dismantlement of the WRC and the complete transference of power 
to the LGB severely hindered the establish lines of communication between the 
British authorities and the refugee community, as well as removing individuals ‘on 
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the ground’ who, ordinarily, could have helped to orchestrate the process of 
repatriation.38 In the event, the police service was called upon to help with the 
registration of all remaining refugees; a vast undertaking which required the 
distribution and subsequent collection of a form to be completed by all refugees “as a 
preliminary to their return”.39 Reaching refugees who remained in the provinces 
proved the most challenging task for such police forces. Despite the best efforts of the 
various regional police forces, by February 1919 the LGB had begun to express 
serious misgivings about the administration of the scheme noting that, of the roughly 
14,000 refugees who still remained in Britain, only about half had returned the 
required form which would trigger their repatriation. The remainder, the LGB 
concluded, have “either not received the forms, or else having received them are lying 
low and making no sign”.40  
 Matters were to take a decidedly more serious turn as another government 
department took note of the refugees’ reticence to make themselves known to the 
authorities. Just a week later, the failing scheme found itself the central topic of 
discussion at the Aliens and Nationality Committee, chaired by the Principle Assistant 
Secretary at the Home Office, Sir John Pedder. Pedder and his committee colleagues 
displayed little of the ambiguity about the process of repatriation articulated by the 
Repatriation Committee. Now considered a Home Office matter, Belgian refugees 
found themselves the object of both a far more stringent tone and far more stringent 
state policy. Talk no longer rotated around how the remaining Belgians in the country 
could be persuaded to return but instead prioritised the much more direct approach of 
serving notices upon any refugee who could be located, requiring them to explain why 
they had not yet taken up the offer of funded repatriation. Deportation, although a 
‘last resort’, nonetheless remained on the table. To enact the agreed upon measure, 
police forces up and down the country were once again called upon to serve the 
refugees with notices and “warnings” to take advantage of the provisions in place for 
their repatriation “at their earliest opportunity”.41  
The looming prospect of the expiration of available shipping to transport the 
refugees back to the continent partly explained the sudden change of tact towards the 
refugees. The Ministry of Shipping could only guarantee ships until the end of 
March.42 On that basis the LGB declared themselves particularly anxious to “get rid 
of as many as possible” before that date.43 To hasten the Belgians’ departure, the LGB 
decreed that threats, such as the withdrawal of free passage and any other assistance 
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from the British government, should be now be deployed indiscriminately. Only those 
who had good reason not to avail themselves of the government scheme – the sick and 
wounded – would be spared the nationwide crackdown. What followed was the 
imposition of a final three-day deadline for refugees to complete their application 
form to expedite their return. Failure to do so meant the forfeiting of any further 
opportunity for assistance; financial or otherwise.44  
 By the early autumn of 1919 the British government had all but washed their 
hands of the any refugees who still remained in the country, withdrawing all financial 
assistance and drawing the repatriation scheme to a close. In the aftermath of war, 
priorities and resources had shifted to more pressing domestic matters; a change of 
tact welcomed by the British public.45 In mid-October the Home Office wrote to the 
Chief Constable of the Police to inform him that any remaining formal avenues of 
repatriation were now being managed entirely by the Belgian Government although 
this too would be withdrawn at the end of November.46 The Belgian Government, 
now solely in charge of extracting any Belgians who remained in Britain, turned to a 
heady mix of patriotic sentiment, emotive persuasion and guilt-ridden reproaches, 
issuing notices in English, Flemish and French beseeching all remaining refugees to 
return to Belgium to assist with the enormous task of “national reconstruction”.47 The 
time had come for moving on and moving forward, especially as the hospitality of the 
British could no longer be relied upon.  
 
Entering the ‘Twilight Zone’ 
For those Belgians who did avail themselves of the opportunity to return to their 
homeland, either during the war years, or immediately after its conclusion, via the 
British government’s repatriation scheme or by other means, the country that they 
arrived in was a place often starkly and terribly different from the one they had left 
behind in 1914. Four years of warfare and occupation had left gaping physical scars 
on the Belgian landscape, cut through by trenches, weapons dug-outs and corpse-
strewn battlefields. Many villages, towns and cities across the country had suffered 
under repeated bombardment, military action, occupation and looting, some affected 
on a massive scale, with physical devastation most evident in the northern provinces 
of West and East Flanders. Although the ruination was not as extreme as in parts of 
northern France, the war and its aftermath had nonetheless left a severely depleted 
nation and people in its wake. During the German occupation and eventual 
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withdrawal, Belgian industrial sites and infrastructure had been a particular target for 
partial or complete sabotage or demolition, often as a means to cripple Belgian efforts 
to oppose the occupation, as punishment for non-cooperation, or, as appeared to be 
the objective of the departing German army, to hinder Belgium’s economic recovery 
in peacetime.48 
However, arguably the most significant impact of warfare as four years of 
conflict, death and destruction inched painstakingly slowly to a negotiated ceasefire 
was the protracted and deep-rooted effects felt by the people of the newly liberated 
nation. In Belgium, even the inevitability of the German surrender by the early 
autumn of 1918 brought little stability for the population of villages and towns 
directly in the path of the retreating armies. As the Liverpool Daily Post reported 
towards the end of October, as the war entered its final throws “processions” of men, 
women and children from Belgium and France as well as detachments of German 
soldiers had begun to flee over the border into Dutch territory away from the remnants 
of the conflict zones, “their condition every bit as bad” as that of the medley of human 
traffic which had criss-crossed the continent at the beginning of the war. Even 
Belgium’s major urban centres could not escape the turmoil of the war’s final days. 
Whilst the newspaper reported that Antwerp was “quiet”, Brussels experienced “hours 
of the tensest emotions and excitement” as “nearer and nearer” came “the sound of the 
guns heralding delivery”. German civilians who had spent the war in the city now 
began to depart en masse and German soldiers left their posts, both to be replaced by 
a reported one hundred and fifty thousand refugees who had poured into the city from 
surrounding regions. Hence, in the maelstrom of the war’s conclusion, as war receded 
but peace was not yet within grasp, the line between soldiers, civilians and refugees, 
conflict zones and civilian zones became ever more blurred.49  
As ‘peacetime’ arrived after the November 11 armistice, only slowly did the 
true human and material cost of war and occupation begin to dawn. The Exeter and 
Plymouth Gazette typified the impassioned (and yet often poorly informed) stance 
adopted by many whose demands for recompense for Belgians depended upon 
sensationalist details about the manner of the peoples’ suffering. Under occupation, 
the Gazette’s special correspondent claimed, Belgians had been “reduced to eating 
mangold wurzels, turnips, and beetroots, robbing the cattle to keep themselves 
alive”.50 Other British newspapers adopted a more restrained stance to Belgian 
anguish, juxtaposing the bittersweet sorrows caused by four long years of war against 
85 
 
the unbridled elation that war was finally over. One regional British newspaper, for 
example, tempered their account of the scenes of joy in Mons, in the west of Belgium, 
with the evident misery felt by the town’s people for the “gallant comrades who had 
fallen”. As the national anthem was sung and crowds lined the streets to cheer, 
“bronzed and hardened soldiers” stood erect, many unable to sing for the tears 
pouring down their faces. This paradox of joy and sorrow found a strange echo in the 
town’s architecture where “faces peer[ed] forth from the shattered windows and 
twisted iron balconies” to throw flowers and wave flags. Into this scene entered “a 
pathetic stream of returning refugees, with their bedding and household goods on 
small borrows”; symbols of the many thousands of refugees who returned to Belgium 
from Britain, the Netherlands and other surrounding neutral and allied nations as war 
drew to a close.51 
Mons was hence just one of hundreds of towns and cities to witness a near 
continuous returning flow of refugees in the early weeks and months of peacetime. As 
one British correspondent rather poetically suggested, by the winter of 1918 Belgium 
and France were awash with weary “pilgrims” travelling by any and every means to 
reach their long abandoned home. Cecil Roberts, author of the “pilgrim” moniker and 
Special Correspondent for the Liverpool Echo, submitted a moving account of just 
such a spectacle as he and a travelling companion attempted the long overland 
journey between Cologne and Lille by way of Germany, Belgium and France’s 
creaking rail networks. The final leg of their journey, when train travel became 
impossible, was undertaken by lorry; their travelling companions a motley assortment 
of soldiers and released prisoners (of various nationalities) and returning Belgian 
refugees. Whilst in transit, Roberts reported that one elderly lady recounted her tale of 
finding herself trapped near Brussels in 1914 unable to return to her home in Tournai. 
It was with trepidation that she now returned, uncertain if her husband would still be 
alive and her house still standing “for she had received no word during all that time”. 
Nonetheless, Roberts insisted, the storyteller was a “cheerful old lady” who “joined 
in” with the singing of the other inhabitants of the lorry, remaining stoical and 
uncomplaining in the face of such adversity.52  
This valorisation of Belgians as noble victims of a belligerent aggressor – a 
distinct echo of the propagandist rhetoric crafted in Britain about ‘gallant little 
Belgium’ in the early months of the war – goes against the reading offered by various 
scholars which suggests that, by the war’s conclusion, Belgians had begun to lose 
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their heroic status.53 Yet, that image clearly continued to exist in certain circles at 
least; in this instance to provide an appealing media narrative of forbearance and 
hope.54 So too did the persistence of such rhetoric help to shore up the government’s 
insistence that the war had both necessary and morally justifiable. This was a 
particularly crucial message to convey as the true human and material cost of four 
years of conflict became a source of consternation and despair for many Britons once 
the euphoria of early November was over.55 Moreover, the unremitting demonisation 
of Germany also helped to firm up the resolve of the nation to impose severe penalties 
upon the now-chastened country as negotiations began over the terms of the peace 
treaty. A report by Francis Hyde Villiers, Minister to Belgium, at the end of 
December 1918 to former Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, now Foreign Secretary, 
about the condition of Brussels after the evacuation of the Germans, demonstrated the 
government’s commitment to this type of rhetoric: Villiers insisted that the “hardship” 
suffered by “almost every class” of Brusselois society was a direct consequence of the 
“odious character” of the occupying forces. As Villiers explained, “The arrogance of 
the Germans, restrictions, house-to-house raids, requisitions, fines, trials and 
condemnations, the uncertainty as to what each day might not bring forth produced a 
strain which was hard to bear”. Nonetheless, Villiers concluded, “with but few 
exceptions, the attitude of the [Belgian] people remained admirable”. 56 
In Britain at a local level too there appeared to be an appetite for persisting 
with the presentation of Belgian refugees as pathetic and aggrieved. A letter from Jean 
Meunes, a recently returned Belgian refugee, to Mr W. Cuthbert of Carlton Place, 
Glasgow, demonstrating this trend found its way into the Scotsman in early January 
1919 (presumably because Mr Cuthbert felt there would be a ready audience for 
Meunes’ “pathetic letter”). “It was a very poor view when we arrived” back in 
Hoboken, Antwerp, the letter began. “All the cranes for loading and unloading the 
goods of the steamers were stolen and sent to Germany . . . the grass was growing 
between the pavements like a meadow, that were [sic] our first impression when we 
arrived, and a very poor one”. Meunes went on to give an account of the severe food 
shortages, the “exhausted”, “pale and grey faces” of the people of Antwerp, only 
“covered in rags”, the city’s industry laying “idle” because the machinery has been 
looted or destroyed, and the lack of jobs for the city’s inhabitants.57  
Whilst the letter served as a pertinent reinforcement of the image of a 
courageous yet broken Belgium, it also operates as an important reminder that, whilst 
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the war may have come to an end this did not automatically signal the end of relations 
between Britons and Belgians. Instead, some Britons, especially those who had 
directly hosted refugee families, remained concerned for the welfare of ‘their’ 
Belgians long after their return. Moreover, the frequent local press reports into 
conditions in Belgium into the early 1920s seemed to address a demand for ‘follow 
up’ which the haste of the government’s repatriation scheme had abruptly curtailed, 
on a formal level at least. None more so was this apparent than in the visit of the 
former Mayor and Mayoress of Preston and the city’s Town Clerk to devastated 
regions of Northern France and Belgium in the spring of 1920. At the wartime 
Mayor’s behest, a fund to help relieve the suffering of the people of Le Bassee on the 
French-Belgian border, had been launched in Preston “some time ago”. The Preston 
delegation’s visit thus served the important purpose of seeing how those funds would 
be spent, as well as offering the opportunity to report back on conditions in the border 
region to the curious and concerned people of Preston. The visit was, according to the 
Lancashire Daily Post, characterised by moments of delighted encounter between the 
British visitors and Belgians formerly resident of Preston who “impressed upon the 
visitors time after time their everlasting gratitude to Preston people”. Such open 
displays of indebtedness was sufficient to “satisfy” the former Mayor that “what we 
are doing [in providing financial assistance] is right”.58    
However, relations between Britons and Belgians were not always as 
affectionate as the example of Preston suggests. Certainly not all former hosts seemed 
willing to reflect upon their interactions with their Belgian guests as an 
unconditionally positive experience. Indeed, it was frequently the moment at which 
the long-awaited departure of the Belgians occurred which seemed to bring forth such 
reservations, as a report in the Sheffield Independent implied. Whilst the local 
“colony” of refugees were declared to have been “good”, this judgement was made 
almost entirely based upon the refugees’ willingness “to assimilate and learn English” 
as well as their efforts to support themselves through finding suitable employment. 
There was little space in such relations for unadulterated sympathy for the Belgians as 
refugees and exiles facing many years of personal and national reconstruction in a 
country devastated by war.59  
Other isolated cases suggests that the impending moment of departure brought 
its own traumas for refugees who knew they would soon be repatriated. For some, this 
no doubt manifested itself in the unpleasant and unsettling task of selling off furniture 
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and personal possessions accumulated in the course of the war.60 For others, the 
rupture occasioned by the prospect of return migration found a more dramatic outlet. 
In December 1919, for example, Jeanne de Lattin, a refugee resident in Blackpool, 
took her own life “rather than return to her husband in Belgium”.61 Indeed, even if the 
challenges and trauma of departure from the security and sanctuary offered by Britain 
were overcome, then many former refugees still found that they had to surmount the 
trials of reintegration in Belgium and acceptance by their fellow Belgian citizens. In 
the early weeks and months after return, as well as the logistical and practical hurdles 
of trans-national travel, finding employment and locating food and clothing, returning 
refugees also had to face the stigma frequently foisted upon them by their fellow 
countrymen. As one account given in the Yorkshire Evening Post from a former 
refugee now returned to Belgium implied, those who had endured the German 
occupation resented those sectors of the population who had lived out the war in 
Britain, convinced that they had enjoyed the “double advantage” of “making money 
and living free of rent and rates, with food and clothing provided”.62  
However, this source of tension between Belgian and Belgian was far more 
complex than the newspaper appeared to realise; so emotionally deep-rooted and 
divergent were the wartime experiences of the “homestayers” and “those of the Yser”. 
Henry de Man, a prominent Belgian socialist who enjoyed a spell as a lecturer in 
Sociology at the University of Washington after the war, attempted to articulate the 
extent of this fissure for a North American audience in an article for The North 
American Review in May 1920. In his wide-ranging article, Man, in a clear departure 
from the account offered in the Yorkshire Evening Post, saw little advantage for those 
who had spent their war away from Belgium, whether serving on the front line or in 
self-exile in Britain or France. For Man, all such exiles had occupied the front line, 
either literally or figuratively, and thus the “shock of disappointment” upon return, of 
“finding that nothing had changed” despite their experiences in the “fermenting 
world” beyond their homeland served only to drive a wedge between themselves and 
those who had remained behind.63   
With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, Belgium’s fragile post-war social 
infrastructure came under even further strain. The disappointment of few territorial 
gains and a sense of betrayal at the comparatively meagre reparations awarded to 
Belgium compared to that negotiated for the other Allied nations engendered 
bitterness and resentment towards foreign neighbours, especially those who had 
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appeared, through four long years of conflict, to be Belgium’s friend and protector.64 
As Henri Jaspar, Belgium’s Foreign Minister, complained in a speech to the British 
Institute of International Affairs in May 1924, the retraction of guarantees to enshrine 
the “inviolability” of Belgian territory, a principle that Jaspar regarded as fundamental 
to her establishment in 1830, signified the “gravest” and “one of the most 
incomprehensible omissions” of the treaty. So too was the diminishing prospect of 
financial support, either by way of reparations or from international aid to help 
Belgium with the considerable task of national reconstruction, a source of 
considerable consternation. Whilst Jaspar insisted that such developments were “but 
an episode in our history” – a “serious but temporary” one – that in time would be 
overcome, relations between Belgium and Britain had noticeably soured by the mid-
1920s. Even the “admirable and disinterested” help offered by Britain to “unhappy 
Belgium in the most tragic hours of her life” at the outbreak of war seemed poor 
compensation for the more immediate and critical material needs of a nation suffering 
under the prolonged traumas of the destructive legacies of war.65  
For Jaspar, the thousands of Belgian refugees who had been hosted by Britons 
during the First World War featured as little but an afterthought in his lengthy 
invective, despite the “everlasting memories” he assumed they held of their 
experiences in “British homes”. Far more serious were the physical scars left upon the 
nation’s landscape, the ‘systematic destruction’ of many of her industrial sites and 
residential areas, and the deportation and massacre of her civilians. The ordeal of 
exile and displacement endured by Belgians who had chosen or been forced to flee 
made little discernible impression upon Jaspar’s tangled and complex sense of 
national loss and suffering.66  
This marginalisation of the refugee experience was to become a staple of both 
Belgium’s post-war reconstruction programme and of the nation’s culture of memory 
and remembrance about the conflict. The establishment of a national compensation 
scheme for “war victims” which included within its provisions “civilian invalids” 
made no allowances for the psychological injuries caused by the traumas of flight, 
exile and refugeedom.67 Neither has there been any formal acknowledgement of the 
refugee experience within Belgium’s centenary commemorations, although one of the 
Belgian government’s stated core commemorative themes is “collective 
remembrance”.68 Sophie de Schaepdrijver has suggested that this absence of a 
concretised “locus of tragedy” in Belgium in the post-war period, of which the 
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exclusion of the refugee experience is one particularly glaring omission, can be partly 
explained by Belgium’s loss of status as “heroic” and “gallant” as the war dragged to 
its bloody conclusion. According to Schaepdrijver, once the “body count” came to 
“overshadow” the founding myths of the war – Germany as belligerent aggressor 
being the most fundamental of these – the “culture of war” itself was rapidly 
dismantled and with it the image of Belgium as the antithesis to German belligerence. 
The final death knell to Belgium’s wartime image was signalled by the signing of the 
Treaty of Versailles, by which point “‘Belgium’, once shorthand for the moral issues 
of the war, had become a by-word for propaganda”. For Belgian society, already 
fractured internally along linguistic, religious, and cultural fault lines, this stark shift 
in her externally projected and accepted identity exacerbated these fissures. Divergent 
wartime experiences as well as further social splintering in the post-war years as 
Flemish nationalism came increasingly to the fore, made the possibility of coming 
together as a “community of fate” – of which the former refugees might be a part - 
ever more remote in the decades since the war’s conclusion.69 The internal ruptures of 
the Belgian nation hence mimicked the ‘refugee experience’ itself: far from singular 
and uniform, and an improbable candidate (as a collective episode of trauma) through 
which to unify the nation.            
 
As Anton van den Braumbussche has intonated, “The many centrifugal forces within 
the Belgian nation have undeniably prevented Belgium from coming to terms with a 
sometimes difficult, compromising, and unbearable past”. This blinkered view, 
according to van den Braumbussche, has extended to the skirting of necessary 
national debates on not least Belgium’s “historical responsibilities” but also its 
“traumatic experiences”.70 In Belgium, the refugee experience of a possible two 
million of its citizens, caught up within this broader culture of avoidance, has thus 
enjoyed little of the elevated treatment that has been bestowed upon in it in Britain.71 
This is in part, perhaps, because of the lingering stigma attached to the status of being 
a refugee, even in a global society increasingly conversant with the plight of refugees. 
So too, however, does it speak of a very particular culture of remembrance of the First 
World War (so often replicated for other episodes of conflict) which valorises 
combatant contributions and civilian sacrifice but has not yet extended its sympathies 
to those who were forced to flee the zones of conflict. 
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 In Britain, however, there has been far less reticence to make ‘use’ of her 
historic role as a ‘protector’ and ‘saviour’ of ‘needy’ refugees from Belgium. Doing 
so has helped to uphold Britain’s vaulted image as a beacon of tolerance; however 
inaccurate the record of her treatment of aliens and newcomers across and beyond the 
twentieth century has shown this image to be. However, in the case of the episode of 
Belgian presence in Britain, the perpetuation of this image has come at the expense 
(or the advantage, depending upon your perspective) of side-lining the realities of the 
final stages of war for the refugee community. The process of repatriation and return 
was disruptive at best and deeply distressing and enduringly traumatic at worst for 
many refugees; an experience helped little by the rather mercenary manner in which it 
was managed by the British government. The haste with which the state-funded 
repatriation scheme was enacted was promoted as the ‘generous’ final act of a 
benevolent Britain but operated, first and foremost, to serve Britain’s own interests. 
Removing refugees as swiftly as possible served to neutralise possible sources of 
localised tension between the hosts and the hosted, address domestic anxieties about 
Britain’s own task of recovery and reconstruction, and reaffirm the government’s 
promise that the incomers would be but a temporary presence only. 
 The continued concern of individuals, families and local relief organisations 
for the fate of returning Belgians was a far cry from the political use made of the 
repatriation process by the British state. Many communities were, instead, in the main 
motivated by a genuine humanitarian instinct to inquire about the welfare of ‘their’ 
Belgians long after the war’s conclusion, although they too were not immune to the 
moral elevation that exuberant displays of gratitude by their former guests bestowed 
upon them. Indeed, these differing responses to the conclusion of the refugee episode 
demonstrates how divergent and distinctly regarded was the experience of playing 
host in ‘real’ terms (that is, for local people as against the ‘remote’ hospitality offered 
by the British state). The ‘end’ of the war marked only a new stage in relations as 
former refugees left behind the traumas of exile for the challenges of return, 
reconstruction and recovery.   
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